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Life history models can include a wide range of biological and ecological features that affect 
exploited fish populations. However, they typically treat fishing mortality as an exogenous 
parameter. Implicitly, this approach assumes that the supply of fishing effort is perfectly 
inelastic. That is, the supply curve of effort is vertical. Fishery modelers often run simulations for 
different values of fishing mortality, but his exercise also assumes vertical supply and simply 
explores a series of these curves as different scenarios. The seemingly innocuous assumption of 
vertical supply conflicts with a large body of empirical work on behavior of fishermen and 
fishing fleets. Economists and fisheries scientists consistently find that fishing behavior is 
responsive to economic opportunities over time and space as well as across target species. 
Accounting for this phenomenon requires that fishing mortality be made endogenous. This paper 
demonstrates an approach to endogenizing fishing mortality in life history models by allowing 
the fish stock in the previous period and other behavioral drivers to enter into the equation that 
predicts fishing effort in the next period. The paper discusses conditions under which the 
standard approach is approximately accurate and when endogenous fishing mortality 
dramatically alters model predictions. An empirical application to the Gulf of Mexico gag, a 
species of grouper, illustrates the importance of endogenizing fishing mortality. Accounting for 
fishing behavior ultimately will improve predictions from management models and avoid 
fisheries management failures.  
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  There is little doubt that human exploitation of the marine environment profoundly 
affects marine ecosystems and the availability of fish for future generations (Botsford et al 1997; 
Pauly et al. 1998; Jackson et al. 2001; Myers and Worm 2003; NRC 1999; UNFAO 2000; Pew 
2003).  The dilemma is what to do about it. The gut reaction of most scientists is to restrict 
where, when, how, and how often we fish. But when our resource base continues to degrade in 
spite of our best efforts, we are left wondering why. The answer is simple. Policies are put in 
place, and humans adjust to them. When we constrain people in one activity, they do not simply 
go away but instead engage in another activity. Policies that fail to recognize this fundamental 
fact do little more than treat the symptoms of resource degradation without regard for the 
underlying causes (Wilen 2006).    
  Among the most promising developments in marine conservation biology is our growing 
knowledge about life history characteristics of fish and other marine species. Fisheries scientists 
and managers have long considered age-dependent growth and mortality in modeling (Beverton 
and Holt  1957), and recent studies have reinforced the importance of life history features for 
marine conservation (e.g. Heppell et al. 2000). Larger individuals tend to produce more offspring 
than smaller ones (Palumbi 2004), while individual offspring of older fish can be more viable 
than those of younger fish (Berkeley et al. 2004). Many species of fish are hermaphroditic, and 
there is theoretical support that harvesting pressure for sequential hermaphodites can lead to   3
sudden collapses in populations (Armsworth 2001). There is also some evidence that size-
selective fishing pressure can induce evolutionary changes in fish populations over relatively 
short time horizons (Conover and Munch 2002).  
To promote sustainable fisheries and ecosystems, managers have a range of policy 
instruments at their disposal, including limited entry programs, individual fishing quotas, gear 
restrictions, size limits, season closures, and marine reserves and other area closures. These 
policies often aim to protect organisms at different life stages. For instance, size limits may 
protect young, immature fish to give them an opportunity to reproduce; season closures may 
protect fish during spawning; and area closures may allow some fish to grow larger and produce 
more offspring. In spite of growing awareness about life history characteristics in fisheries 
management, we often fail to achieve conservation goals.  
  A great challenge and opportunity for marine conservation biology is to combine the 
insights from life history models with insights from economics and the social sciences about how 
humans behave in response to policy. What everyone would like to know is whether and under 
what circumstances policy interventions that target life stages are actually effective in achieving 
their goals. Although marine conservationists and fishing interests may not always agree on 
management objectives, no one has a stake in destroying the productive capacity of our oceans. 
When policies that aim to conserve fish populations fail to do so, fishing interests lose out. 
Similarly, when policies that aim to generate fishing profits fail to do so, they can exacerbate 
pressure on marine resources and ultimately cause conservation interests to lose out. A 
systematic consideration of biological and economic forces that interact with management offers 
a way out of this predicament.     4
  Many management failures fundamentally stem from the lack of an interdisciplinary 
perspective. It is not path-breaking economic analysis to suggest that people fish more when 
prices are high, nor is it earth-shattering ecology to suggest that age-dependent fecundity is a 
determinant of population growth, but models rarely incorporate both forces. Life history models 
in particular ignore fishing behavior. Age-structured and stage-based modeling infrastructures 
are relatively advanced for incorporating new insights from ecology but relatively primitive for 
incorporating new insights from social  and behavioral sciences. As a result, there is a disconnect 
between management models and the effects of management on fishing fleets. Fishery managers 
only indirectly control fishing mortality, and these indirect controls induce behavioral responses 
of fishermen and vessels that may reinforce management goals or undermine those goals (Wilen 
et al. 2002). Managers essentially plug one leak only to see another spring up somewhere else. 
Management models are unable to diagnose these behavioral responses because they assume 
direct control of fishing mortality. Thus, predicted success of certain policies becomes 
tautological, but actual outcomes are poorly understood and may be successes or failures.  
   Life history models of exploited fish populations typically treat fishing mortality as an 
exogenous parameter. This approach implicitly assumes that the supply of fishing effort is 
perfectly inelastic. That is, the supply curve of effort is vertical. Modelers run simulations for 
different values of fishing mortality, but this exercise also assumes vertical supply and simply 
explores a series of these curves as different scenarios. The seemingly innocuous assumption of 
vertical supply conflicts with a large body of empirical work; economists consistently find that 
fishing behavior is responsive to economic opportunities over time and space as well as across 
target species (Bockstael and Opaluch 1983; Holland and Sutinen 2000; Smith 2002; Eggert and 
Tveteras 2004). Accounting for this phenomenon is crucial for predicting the effectiveness of   5
conservation and fishery management policies and requires that fishing mortality be made 
endogenous. That is, fishing mortality must be dynamically linked in life history modeling such 
that the fish stock in the previous period and other behavioral drivers enter into the equation that 
predicts fishing effort in the next period, and the resulting stock post-fishing feeds into the 
predicted fishing effort in the following period. Only models that capture the dominant causal 
links in bioeconomic systems will be successful in predicting and avoiding management failures. 
This paper builds on the work of Smith et al. (2006) to illustrate how traditional 
management models in fisheries go wrong and can compromise conservation goals by ignoring 
economic behavior.  Specifically, the results show how fishing effort supply shifts at various 
times during the year in response to a seasonal closure in the Gulf of Mexico gag fishery and 
what a model without the economic behavior implicitly shows about fishing effort supply. In the 
next section, I describe the empirical model and how it differs from a standard matrix model of 
fish population dynamics. The following section reviews the empirical application in the Gulf of 
Mexico. Next, I present results and focus particularly on how a seasonal closure affects fishing 
behavior throughout an entire calendar year. In our discussion, I put forward one possible 
explanation for the seemingly paradoxical result: that total fishing effort actually increases in 
response to a seasonal closure. Finally, I draw some conclusions about the broader role of 
empirical bioeconomic modeling in marine conservation.  
 
Model Description 
  The biological model is a standard age-structured life history model that incorporates 
several unique features to reflect stage transitions for a sequential hermaphrodite and a hockey-
stick recruitment function (to reflect habitat limited recruitment). There are four life stages in the   6
model: recruits, immature females, mature females, and males. Surviving new recruits all 
become immature females. The number of surviving fish in each age class depends on natural 
and fishing mortality. Fish of each age grow according to a von Bertallanfy growth function. 
Fishable biomass (the fish stock from the point of view of fishermen) simply adds up the number 
of individuals in each age class above the size limit, applying allometric parameters to convert 
fish length to weight. Egg production by individual mature female is an increasing and convex 
function of fish length, while fertilization success is a concave function of the percentage of 
males in the population.  
The distinction between a standard life history model (hereafter NOECON) and the 
model that accounts for fishing behavior (hereafter ECON) involves the manner in which the 
model treats fishing mortality. The basic approach follows Smith and Wilen (2003) but is 
customized for this application in Smith et al. (2006). NOECON incorporates fishing mortality 
as a fixed, exogenous parameter. As a consequence, if the fish stock increase, the rate of fishing 
mortality remains constant, and the total harvest of fish is simply scaled up according to fishable 
biomass. Moreover, when a seasonal closure occurs, the fishing mortality rate is simply scaled 
back according to the number of closed days. So, if there are 15 days out of 30 closed in a 
particular month, fishing mortality in the NOECON model is simply half what it would be if 
there were no closure. When put in this way, the standard management model sounds simplistic, 
and yet this is the way that management models are constructed. The ECON model, in contrast, 
makes fishing mortality a function of biomass and other factors that influence fishing effort. It 
not only accounts for the reduction in potential days fished under a seasonal closure, but also 
allows the data to determine how pronounced that reduction actually is.     7
The fishery data enter into the ECON model in two ways. First, there is a statistical 
routine to link fishing effort to catches (a production function). The parameters are estimated 
using nonlinear least squares. The parameter estimates of this routine are conditional on the how 
effort responds to stock, which is the second routine. Here, the model implements logistic 
regression (using maximum likelihood) to estimate fishing trips as a function of stock, weather, 
regulations, and monthly dummies (to capture outside opportunities). The estimates are 
conditional on the production function estimated in the first step. Thus, an iterative procedure is 
used to re-estimate each set of parameters until the entire parameter vector has settled down 
(based on relative Euclidean distance). See Smith et al. (2006) for more technical details about 
the biological and economic models. 
 
Empirical Application 
  The case study in this paper is the Gulf of Mexico gag fishery. Gag (Myceteroperca 
microlepis) is a long-lived, slow-growing grouper that is a protogynous hermaprhodite. Between 
the 1970s and the 1990s, the percentage of male gag declined from 17% to 2% in Gulf of Mexico 
(Coleman et al. 1996; 2000). Gag is an excellent case study for three reasons. First, there is 
substantial policy variation in sample. In order to understand the effects of past policies 
empirically, policy changes need to take place in a time horizon over which we can measure 
outcomes. The Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council (GMFMC) provides this in-sample 
policy variation by forming two marine reserves, changing the size limit for gag, and 
implementing a seasonal closure during the gag spawning season. Second, I have built an 
extensive relational database of fisheries micro-data. The database contains U.S. NOAA 
Fisheries fishing logbook data (ten years of daily observations), Florida landings tickets, NOAA   8
weather buoys, online records of policy decisions of the GMFMC, county-level unemployment, 
and an original survey of reef-fish fishery captains that I conducted in 2005. This data set allows 
one to analyze economic substitution across space, time, and target species in response to policy 
changes. Here the focus will be only on inter-temporal substitution due to the technical 
challenges of integrating endogenous fishing mortality into a life history model, and the survey 
data will not be used. Third, a published empirically-based life history analysis exists for gag 
(Heppell et al. 2006).  
In previous work, colleagues and I adapted the Heppell et al. (2006) model to incorporate 
inter-temporal behavioral responses to changes in the fish stock and the policy environment 
(Smith et al. 2006). Using an iterative econometric routine, we estimate behavioral parameters, a 
parameters from the fishing production function, and one key biological parameter (an initial 
condition on the shape of the initial abundance size distribution). See Smith et al. (2006) for 
additional technical details of the estimation. The focus of the current paper is to provide a 
heuristic explanation of how endogenous fishing mortality affects management outcomes using 
an analogy to supply curves and supply functions.  
 
Results 
  Table 1 repeats the key qualitative findings in Smith et al. (2006). The message here is 
simple; all of the qualitative conclusions about the policy reverse when one accounts for 
behavioral responses of the fishing fleet. A standard management model (NOECON) predicts 
that a seasonal closure will reduce fishing effort, increase biomass, and also reduce pressure on 
large, older fish. The latter effect would thus address concerns about the gag sex ratio.  
Incorporating economic behavior (ECON), however, leads to the opposite conclusion for every   9
indicator. It is not surprising that economic behavior offsets some of the policy impacts, but in 
this case, behavior more than offsets the policy. The policy that aims to protect stocks actually 
harms them.  
The dynamics of behavior are depicted in Figure 1. For the NOECON model, small 
fluctuations reflect only differences in number of days in each month (e.g. January has 31, but 
February has 28 or 29). The large dips illustrate the implied reduction in fishing effort during the 
seasonal closure. The ECON model nests all of these features and illustrates both short- and 
long-run dynamics of effort. Short dynamics reflect seasonal patterns in prices, openings and 
closings in the red snapper season, opportunities outside of fishing, and weather. Long dynamics 
reflect adjustments in the stock that are endogenously determined by fishing pressure.  
Because the qualitative reversal in Table 1 is so surprising, it is worth exploring whether 
the model predictions, and not just the parameter estimates, are statistically significant. To this 
end, the point estimates of the biological parameters are fixed, and Figure 2 explores the 
sensitivity of model predictions about average biomass to the behavioral model parameters. 
Specifically, Figure 2 depicts 5,000 Monte Carlo simulations in which behavioral parameters are 
drawn from their empirical distribution (by taking the point estimate parameter vector and 
adding a vector of randomly drawn, independent standard normal variables multiplied by the 
Cholesky factorization of the covariance matrix).  In all cases, the qualitative predictions of 
ECON and NOECON reverse; the seasonal closure increases average biomass in the NOECON 
model but actually reduces biomass in the ECON model. The histograms for the ‘Closure’ and 
‘No Closure’ scenarios do not even overlap in either the ECON or NOECON models.  
Figure 3 illustrates the implied average fishing effort supply curves for the ECON and 
NOECON model. Of interest here is the supply of fishing effort in response to the stock of fish.   10
One can think of the stock of fish as a ‘price’ and number of fishing trips as a ‘quantity.’ A 
supply curve is distinguished from a supply function in that the supply curve fixes all arguments 
of the supply function except price, which in this case is the level of biomass. The shaded box 
illustrates the region over which there is in-sample variation in gag biomass and fishing trips. In 
ECON, fishing mortality is endogenous and responds positively to the stock (the blue line). As 
such, there is some elasticity in the supply curve of effort. The NOECON model, in contrast, 
assumes exogenous effort supply (the green line). Thus, the NOECON supply curve is vertical, 
i.e. perfectly inelastic. The qualitative consequences for management are clear. Any increase in 
the biomass due to some management action will stimulate more fishing effort, and in the long-
run, attenuate at least part of the increased stock. The extent of this attenuation will depend on 
the empirical application. My application in Figure 3 suggests that this attenuation will be 
substantial because the supply curve is relatively flat (elastic in the sample region), implying that 
effort will increase a lot in response to a stock increase.  
Figure 4 shows how modeling fishing effort endogenously affects conclusions about 
seasonal closures. The gag spawning season spans January through April, and since gag 
aggregate to spawn, all other things being equal, one expects a concentration of fishing effort 
during the spawning season. The top panel shows the month of March. The shallow-water 
grouper closure is in effect from until March 15, so 15 out of 31 fishing days are eliminated. The 
assumed change in NOECON is thus a horizontal shift in the supply curve (solid green to dotted 
pink). However, the real change empirically is shown by the ECON model (solid blue to dotted 
red). To see what a difference this makes, a horizontal black line depicts the average biomass in 
sample. From this, one can see the short-run effort change in the ECON model. Thus, the real   11
reduction (ECON model) in fishing effort due to the closure during March is less than half of the 
assumed reduction in the standard management model (NOECON).  
The story so far is that the ECON model shows how the policy is less effective than 
managers expected, but the story does not end there. The bottom panel depicts fishing effort 
response in April (still during the spawning season but after the seasonal closure). Because there 
is no seasonal closure in April, the NOECON model assumes that there is no change in fishing 
effort, and the exogenous effort supply curve does not shift. Empirically, however, effort supply 
does shift in the ECON model (blue to dotted red). Unlike in the top panel, effort supply in April 
shifts outward. That is, there is more fishing effort in April due to the closure in February and 
March. Economically, this is not surprising in and of itself. Some of the reduction in fishing 
effort from earlier in the year is displaced into later parts of the year.  
Figure 5 repeats the analysis in Figure 4, but here the month of May is examined because 
it falls after the spawning season. As in the bottom panel of Figure 4, the NOECON model 
predicts that fishing effort will not respond to the seasonal closure. The ECON model, however, 
shows in increase in effort. The increase is less pronounced than the increase during April, but it 
exists nonetheless. At the margin, this effect is not surprising economically, though it runs 
counter to the way in which standard management models incorporate fishing effort. What is 
surprising is that the total effort increase aggregated over the year more than offsets the reduction 
of effort due to the closure (Table 1).  
 
Discussion  
Naturally, the immediate question to ask is why fishermen increase total effort in 
response to the seasonal closure. After all, Figures 3-5 show that supply of fishing effort is   12
upward sloping with regard to the fish stock, one of the key determinants of the profitability of 
fishing. This section develops a three-period model of effort supply for an individual fisherman. 
The goal is to show that the seemingly counterintuitive result of increased total effort can be 
explained by consumption smoothing combined with a subsistence constraint. At the onset, it is 
important to note a caveat: this explanation is not directly modeled in the empirical analysis. 
Thus, to formally test this explanation would require more statistical analysis and possibly 
additional data on incomes of fishermen and employment opportunities in other fisheries (and 
outside of fishing). 
Previous analyses in the literature have focused on short-run profit maximization in 
response to management. For instance, Anderson (1999) shows that binding regulations reduce 
profits in the short run but can, in some circumstances, increase output. Though not modeled 
directly, he discusses individual preferences for leisure as another potentially important 
behavioral determinant. In a more recent paper, Anderson (2004) argues that motivations beyond 
profit maximization can lead to fishing strategies that target harvest or profit goals, and he shows 
that goal achievement can explain seemingly perverse economic behavior. I focus on labor-
leisure tradeoffs in a utility maximization framework and find that binding regulations, while 
reducing utility, can increase or decrease total fishing effort. The implication is that seasonal 
closures can potentially induce a perverse behavioral response in many fisheries throughout the 
world. The empirical result in the gag fishery is just one example. 
  Suppose that fishermen derive utility in each period (t) from a composite consumption 
good (Ct) with price normalized to one and leisure (Lt). The three periods together constitute a 
calendar year, and for simplicity, assume away time preferences. The fisherman has a total time 
allotment in each period ( t L ) to divide between fishing effort (Et) and leisure. Assume that   13
fisherman earn income (It) only from fishing. In each period, revenue is the product of the price 
of fish (pt), the fish stock (Xt), effort exerted, and a cathability coefficient (qt). Time-varying 
catchability explicitly captures productivity differences across periods. Costs are proportional to 
effort with a parameter c. Note that c includes operating costs like fuel and bait but does not 
include the cost of a fisherman’s time, which is implicit in the labor-leisure tradeoff. Income 
from fishing can be written as: 
(1)  tt t t t tt t I pqEX c E wE =− = , 
where tt t t wp q Xc =− . In a simple model structure like the one presented here, one can think of 
catchability differences also representing time-varying opportunity costs due to substitute 
economic activities or differences in typical weather conditions during periods that would affect 
an individual’s pattern of fishing effort over time. Seasonal closures in each period constrain the 
individual’s total effort in the period (
MAX
t E ). 
  To characterize the situation of many owner-operator fishermen in industrialized 
countries as well as artisanal fishermen in developing countries, I introduce a subsistence 
constraint (
MIN
t C ). For artisanal fishermen, 
MIN
t C may represent the need to generate enough 
income to feed oneself and one’s family. More likely in industrial fishing is that a minimum 
income is required in each period to make boat payments, dock rental fees, home mortgage 
payments, and other regular household expenses. 
  To add more realism, the model allows saving and borrowing in periods 1 and 2 (St). 
Essentially, fishermen can smooth consumption in the three periods by shifting their incomes 
across periods. However, the calendar year budget is binding.  Debt service on borrowing across 
years—e.g. for a boat, home, or car—is implicitly folded into the subsistence constraint. 
Fishermen in this model can save or borrow in the short run to accommodate their labor-leisure   14
preferences or to meet subsistence requirements, but they cannot carry debts for non-capital 
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This model is general enough capture spawning pre-closure, spawning post-closure, and post-
spawning portions of a year through time-varying time allotments and catchability coefficients.  
  I illustrate the model in equation (2) with a numerical simulation. Suppose that the utility 
function is Cobb-Douglas with parameters 0.6 (for consumption) and 0.4 (for leisure). Without 
loss of generality, I vary w to represent catchability differences over time. Periods 1 and 2 take 
place during spawning, whereas period 3 takes place after spawning. I set   12 1 ww ==  and 
3 0.75 w =  to capture the increased catchability when fish aggregate to spawn. For simplicity, we 
set  123 1 LLL === . This assumption can easily be relaxed to capture a situation in which the 
period after spawning is longer than either of the periods that divide the spawning season. This 
would match the empirical reality of the gag fishery. Gag aggregate to spawn during the first   15
four months of the year, but the season remains open the remainder of the calendar year. The 
results below also hold for situations in which time allotments vary across periods. 
  Assume that the regulator implements a seasonal closure in period 2 but not in periods  1 
or 3. I explore how the extent of the closure affects fishing effort decisions for three different 
values of the subsistence parameter. For each case, we optimize the model using Matlab’s 
nonlinear constrained optimization routine (FMINCON). The results are depicted in Figure 6. 
  The primary lesson from this numerical simulation is that total fishing effort can increase, 
decrease, or remain the same in response to a seasonal closure. Fixing all other parameters, the 
effect of the closure on total fishing effort aggregated across all three periods depends on the 
extent of the closure and the subsistence requirement.  
  In all three cases, the seasonal closure has no effect on total annual fishing effort if the 
constraint on maximum period 2 effort does not bind (reductions that are less than 50% of the 
period 2 season). Fishermen essentially can substitute within period to maintain their optimal 
labor-leisure tradeoffs. While this result seems obvious once stated, it illustrates how managers 
cannot count on effort reductions in response to marginal changes in seasons. In a real fishery, 
the desirability to substitute within a period will be limited by weather conditions and other 
economic opportunities. Still, if one imagines an extreme case—say a single day closure in a 
two-month period— it is difficult to believe that fishing effort will not find an opportunity to 
substitute into another one of the open days.   
  For the region in which reduced period 2 effort binds, the three cases diverge 
qualitatively. When  0.4
MIN
t C = , subsistence never binds. As a result, total fishing effort is 
always lower than the baseline. This case corresponds to the conventional wisdom that effort 
declines with a seasonal closure. Nevertheless, it is important to note that fishermen substitute   16
some effort into periods 1 and 3; the substitution is just not enough to make up for the effort 
reduction in period 2. Substitution occurs because the marginal utility of consumption in period 2 
with the closure is higher than the marginal utility of leisure in other periods that could be 
foregone in order to redistribute income to period 2. Thus, the standard management model 
assumption that effort decreases proportionally to a seasonal closure is untenable.   
 When  0.6
MIN
t C = , subsistence always binds. That is, consumption in each period is the 
subsistence level. In this case, total effort increases as the restriction on fishing effort in period 2 
tightens. This phenomenon is due to the fact that fishing is less productive in period 3. Thus, 
fishermen must more than compensate for reduced effort in period 2 with increases in periods 1 
and 3.  
 When  0.5
MIN
t C = , subsistence only binds once fishing in period 2 is restricted by more 
than 80%. Between a restriction of 50% and 80%, total effort declines. After 80%, total effort 
starts to rise and eventually reaches a level that is higher than the baseline.   
  Either of the cases in which subsistence binds closely mirrors the empirical output in 
which the coefficients on the closure dummies are positive and large enough to increase total 
fishing effort (Smith et al. 2006). Thus, a simple utility-theoretic model can explain why total 
effort increases in response to a seasonal closure. The theoretical model in equation (2) produces 
this result without any costs of short-run borrowing. If one considers the possibility that short-
run borrowing is costly for fishermen, the empirical result emerges as an even more likely 
outcome. In order to meet long-term capital debt service, e.g. boat payment and home mortgage, 
as well as basic household expenses, a fisherman may incur short-run credit card debt during the 
seasonal closure. To repay this debt and the associated interest, the fisherman needs to generate 
more revenues in the periods after the closure than would have been required without the closure.   17
This is exactly what happens empirically, though there is no way to test directly the effect of 
short-run subsistence constraints in the current empirical modeling framework. 
  Most economists, and probably most fisheries managers, might express discomfort with 
the idea that if you constrain people more, they will fish more intensively. It may be easier to 
accept a subsistence constraint in a developing country context, for instance. But, is this 
reasonable for U.S. fishermen? One piece of supporting evidence that is somewhat orthogonal to 
our empirical analysis is how fishermen respond to questions about fishing in bad weather. In a 
2005 mail survey of Gulf reef fish captains (46% response rate out of all registered permit 
holders), I find that 80% of fishermen agree or strongly agree with the statement “Seasonal 
closures force fishermen to fish in bad weather.”  Thus, reef fish fishermen in their own claims 
support the notion that a seasonal closure changes their marginal values. 
  Empirically, seasonality in prices also supports the mechanism that is operating in this 
theoretical explanation. Averaged over our sample period, gag price is 6.8% higher during 
spawning season than post-spawning. For just 2003, the spawning season premium is 5.2%. 
Thus, gag fishermen, in relative terms, are losing more revenue with a seasonal closure during 
spawning than if there were a closure some other time during the year. If fishermen really are 
attempting to meet some income target, the empirical pattern of price will exacerbate the total 
effort intensification.  
 
Conclusion 
The long-term goal of this research is to refine our understanding of which species are 
vulnerable to overexploitation and extinction by recasting vulnerability as a bioeconomic 
phenomenon and not just a biological one. To what extent will marine reserves, seasonal   18
closures, size limits, and other policies actually protect species at risk once we fully account for 
the behavioral responsiveness of fishing fleets? This paper takes an important step towards 
answering that question by rejecting the reductionist approach of fishery management models in 
which humans are assumed to be unresponsive to changing economic conditions. Instead, fishing 
mortality is made endogenous. All fisheries are coupled systems with biological and economic 
components, but whether explicit modeling of the economics is of first- or second-order 
importance is likely to depend on a wide range of factors. When will biological intuition alone be 
sufficient for protecting critical life stages, and when will economic forces trump this intuition? 
In this particular application, the behavioral response of fishermen is enough to undermine the 
intended outcome of a seasonal closure. This appears to results from both a direct response to the 
policy itself and the elastic effort response to any policy that grows stocks. The science of marine 
conservation currently knows little about these issues in general, but my application illustrates 
that conservation and economic behavior cannot be separated a priori. To harness the power of 
life history modeling for future marine conservation, it is essential to fill this knowledge gap. 
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Figure 1 Dynamic Effect of the Seasonal Closure Policy – First 120 Months are In-Sample 
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Figure 2 Biomass Sensitivity Analysis  23

















































































Figure 3 Average Fishing Effort Supply in a Life History Management Model -  With 
Endogenous Fishing Mortality Effort Supply is not Vertical   24
Assumed Change (-)








































































































































































































Figure 4 Fishing Effort Supply in a Life History Management Model During the Spawning 
Season – The x-axis reports predicted number of gag fishing trips in the month. The two 
panels show March (half of the month closed) and April (none of the month closed)   25
Assumed Change = 0
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Figure 5 Fishing Effort Supply in a Life History Management Model After the Spawning 
Season – The x-axis reports predicted number of gag fishing trips in the month. The panel 
shows May (none of the month closed) 
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Total Effort Can Increase or Decrease in 
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Figure 6 - A Possible Theoretical Explanation for the Empirical Results – Total Fishing 
Effort in a Year Can Increase or Decrease in Response to a Seasonal Closure if Fishermen 
Face Minimum Income Constraints   27
Table 1 - Bioeconomic Policy Simulation Using Point Estimates (from Smith et al. 2006) 
Comparing 1-month Spawning Closure to No Closure 
25 Years Total, 10 Years in-sample 
 
 
No Grouper  Spawning Qualitative
Closure Closure Change Change
Modeling Economic Behavior
Average Biomass (millions kg) 10.798 10.599 -0.199 -
Average Number of Big Fish (> 10 years) 66,160 64,387 -1,773 -
Total Catch (millions kg) 15.719 15.958 0.239 +
Total Trip Days 293,180 306,500 13,320 +
Weighted Catch Per Unit Effort 53.615 52.066 -1.549 -
Ending Percentage of Males (mature fish) 0.0616 0.0601 -0.002 -
No Economic Behavior
Average Biomass 10.303 10.735 0.432 +
Average Number of Big Fish (> 10 years) 61,609 65,277 3,668 +
Total Catch 16.215 15.542 -0.673 -
Total Trip Days 315,650 296,980 -18,670 -
Weighted Catch Per Unit Effort 51.370 52.332 0.962 +
Ending Percentage of Males (mature fish) 0.0603 0.0633 0.003 +  